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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HAL E. HOLMSTEAD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
12,257 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for damages for personal injuries 
caused by the negligence of defendant's agent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court denied defendant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment. Thereafter, this Court granted de-
fendant's Petition for Intermediate Appeal. This 
Court, by its opinion of January 25, 1972, reversed the 
judgment of the trial court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent now seeks a rehearing on the grounds 
that: 1) The Court did not consider important new 
cases on the question of covenants not to sue as releas-
ing a principle. (2) The Court's decision is contrary to 
proper rules of contract construction. ( 3) The Court 
misconstrued the function of a covenant not to sue. 
( 4) The Court's decision will proliferate additional law-
suits. ( 5) The Court's application of respondeat super-
ior defeats the purpose and policy underlying repondeat 
superior. 
STATEMENT OF FAC'fS 
This suit arises out of an accident which occurred 
December 6, 1968, at the intersection of Lehi Main 
Street and the frontage road to I-15 near Lehi in Utah 
County, Utah. A vehicle owned and driven by plaintiff 
collided with a vehicle driven by one Gideon Allen. At 
the time and place of the accident, Gideon Allen was an 
agent and employee of the defendant, Abbott G. M. 
Diesel, Inc., operating said vehicle and acting within 
the scope of his employment. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks 
to hold defendant liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. 
Suit was commenced by filing of the Complaint on 
April 17, 1969, and Summons was served April 18, 1969. 
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The employee -Gideon Allen was not and has not been 
named as a party to this action. 
On July 7, 1969 in consideration of the payment 
in behalf of said Gideon Allen of $10,000, plaintiff ex-
ecuted and delivered a simple covenant uot to sue in 
which he did "covenant aqd agree never to make any 
demand or claim, or commence or cause or permit to be 
prosecuted any action at law or in equity, or any pro-
ceeding of any description, against Gideon Allen be-
cause of personal injury, disability, property damage, 
loss of services, expense or loss of any kind ..• sustained 
. . . in consequence of an accident that occurred on or 
abput the 6th day of December, 1968, at or near Lehi, 
Utah." By mutual mistake a reservation of rights 
against the defendant. Abbott G. M. Diesel was not 
written into the covenant. The covenant was reformed 
to include that reservation. 
On October 29, 1970, Abbott G. l\f. Diesel, Inc., 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the 
pleadings, depositions and records on file and an af fi-
davit of Reed L. Martineau. Both parties filed written 
memorandums in support of their respective positions, 
and on September 18, 1970, District Judge, Joseph E. 
Nelson denied the motion for Summary Judgment. De-
fendant thereupon filed its petition for intermediate 
appeal which was granted January 8, 1971. On January 
25, 1972, this Court handed down its decision reversing 
the denial of defendant's motion for Summary Judg-
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ment, upon the ground that a covenant not to sue given 
an agent must of necessity release the principal from 
liability. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY 
TO THE BETTER REASONED RULE OF 
NEWER AUTHORITIES. 
Three cases decided during 1971 are cited to the 
Court as evidence of a growing trend in the authorities 
which is contrary to the Court's decision in the present 
case. These cases were not available to the plaintiff at 
the time of writing his brief and, therefore, have not 
heretofore been cited to the Court. 
The first case is from the Court of Appeals of New 
York, Plath v. Justus, (Feb. 17, 1971), 28 N.Y. 2d 16, 
268 N.E. 2d 117. In that case the plaintiff's intestate 
was killed by being struck by an automobile owned by 
the defendant but driven by a third party. Plaintiff 
settled with the third party executing a release which 
reserved a right of action against defendant. Defendant 
claimed that because he was only derivatively liable, a 
release of the active tortf easor also released him. The 
Court rejected defendant's argument and held that the 
intent of the parties should govern the affect to be 
given to the release. 
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The case of Mcltlillen v. Klingenamith, 467 SW 
2d 193, was decided on May 12, 1971, by the Supreme 
Court of Texas. Here a woman was injured in an auto-
mobile accident and her injuries were aggravated by 
the negligent treament of a physician. The driver of 
the automobile was released by an instrument that made 
no mention of the physician. The physician argued that 
he was not a joint tortfeasor, that he did not act oon-
currently or in concert with the driver and, therefore, 
he was only secondarily liable. His secondary liability, 
he argued, was released when the original tortf easor 
was released. Reversing its old "unity of release" rule 
under which a release of the original tortf easor would 
also release the malpracticing physician, Justice Pope 
stated that "a release of a party or parties named or 
otherwise specifically identified fully re]eases only the 
parties so named or identified, but no others." 
The third case, decided March 4, 1971, is Bartholo-
mew v. McCartha, 179 S.E. 2d 912, in which the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina stated: 
"Being untrammeled by the ancient nile which, 
in our view tends to stifle settlements, defeat 
the intention of parties and extol technicalities, 
we adopt the view that the release of one torl-
feasor does not release others who wrongfully 
contributed to plaintiff's injuries unless this 
was the intention of the parties, or unless plain-
tiff has, in fact, received full compensation 
amounting to satisfaction." 
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Realizing full· well that the M cCartha case ·deals with 
the liability of joint tortfeasors and not with derivative 
liability it is cited to the Court as evidence of a trend. 
The modem trend is toward giving effect to the inten-
tion of the parties in settlement agreements, rather than 
allowing those intentions to be frustrated by some com-
mon law dogma. While the most recent decisions in the 
country are to the effect that a release with a reserva-
tion of rights should be construed as a covenant not to 
sue so as to protect the injured party's right to a recov-
ery; this Court on the contrary has reached the con-
clusion that a covenant not to sue with a specific reserva-
tfon should be treated as a general release so as to cut 
off the injured party's right to a recovery. 
II. 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY 
Tb PROPER RULES OF CONTRACT CON-
STRUCTION. 
A covenant not to sue is a contract and should be 
interpreted in accordance with the rule of contract con· 
struction that the intention of the parties to the contract 
controls its interpretation. As stated in 2 Williston, 
Contracts [ 3d ed.] section 338A p. 720: 
"The great majority of the later cases, how-
ever, hold that an agreement releasing one 
joint tortfeasor should be construed in accord-
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ance with the intention of the parti~s and that 
if it shows on its face it was not the intention 
of the injured party to relinquish his claim 
against the other joint tortfeasor, and his claim 
has not been fully satisfied, the "release" will 
be construed as having the effect of a cove-
nant not to sue regardless of its form." 
It is clear from the summary of section 338A that the 
author thinks that the intention of the parties should 
govern not only in cases of joint torts, but also in cases 
where the liability of two parties for an injury is based 
upon respondeat superior, and a release or covenant has 
been given to one porty. 
"In summary then, where two or more persons 
are liable for the same injury though their tort 
'WflS not joint, the only question when a release 
has been given to one, should be: Has the plain-
tiff obtained full satisfaction, or what he 
agreed to accept as such, for his injury?" (em--
phasis added) Id. p. 721. 
The plaintiff, Hal Holmstead, did not receive full 
satisfaction for his injuries. Had he known- that the 
$10,000 consideration given for the covenant was to be 
his total recovery, he never would have signed the 
agreement. By the terms of the covenant he reserved a 
right against Abbott G. M. Diesel as part of the con-
sideration for that covenant. The negation of the re-
served right varies the terms of the contract materially. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The contract as so modified by the Court is not sup-
ported by a consideration which would have been satis-
factory to the plaintiff. Certainly, if Hal Holmstead 
gave up his right to seek redress against the defendant, 
Abbott G. M. Diesel, he did so unintentionally, and 
Dean Prosser says, "a plaintiff should never be com- ' 
pelled to surrender his cause of action against any , 
wrongdoer unless he has intentionally done so, or unless ' 
he has received [full satisfaction]". (Prosser, Law of 
Torts [3d ed.], section 46, p. 272.) 
III. 
THE COURT'S DECISION IS BASED 1 
UPON A MISCONCEPTION OF THE FUNC-
TION OF A COVENANT NOT TO SUE. 
In the Court's opinion by Chief Justice Callister 
it is stated: 
"Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
the liability of the master to a third person for 
injuries inflicted by a servant in the course of 
his employment and within the scope of his 
authority is derivative and secondary, while 
that of the servant is primary, and absent any 
delict of the master other than through the 
servant, the exoneration of the servant removes 
the foundation upon which to impute negli-
gence to the master." 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Court has erred b.y 
implying that a covenant not to sue a servant exonerates 
him. It does not exonerate the servant. It is a promise 
not to sue and nothing more. It is not a statement that 
the servant is without fault. The alleged fault of the 
servant remains which, if proved, is imputed to the 
master. It is the fualt of the servant which is the basis 
or foundation of the master's liability. A covenant not 
to sue the servant may relieve him of the burden of pay-
ing the injured party, but it does not relieve or excul-
pate his fa ult. 
IV. 
THE COURT'S DECISION WHICH PUR-
PORTS TO PREVENT CIRCUITOUS AC-
TIONS AND REDUCE LITIGATION WILL 
IN REALITY PROLIFERATE ADDITIONAL 
LAWSUITS. 
As part of the majority's rationale for holding that 
a covenant given the agent releases the principal from 
responsibility, the Court outlines the process whereby 
the principal, if held liable, is subrogated to the rights 
of the injured party and thereafter sues the agent for 
indemnification. The Court fears this circuity of ac-
tion. As a theorectical possibility these circuitous suits 
seem problematic, but, when examined in the sunlight 
of the real world this imagined evil disappears. In 
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reality, the employer will not sue his empk>yee. It is not 
he who paid the injured party; it was the liability in-
surer. Would the insurer then sue the employee? No, 
because the employee is a named insured under the pol-
icy. How can an insurer sue its insured for paying 
that which it has contracted to pay? Certainly, this 
"circuity of action" problem is more imagined than real. 
But, many suits can be foreseen where some un-
wary plaintiff gives a covenant not to sue an agent with 
a reservation against the principal only to find that his 
expressed intent is disregarded in court. The injustice 
under this situation is clear. The plaintiff will feel 
cheated. No doubt he will seek relief in equity to set 
aside a covenant which produced such untoward results 
on the grounds of mistake or fraud. The rule as pres-
ently expressed by the Court is a trap for the unwary. 
The Court's decision will force an injured plaintiff 
to prosecute his case against an agent who was willing 
to settle. The plaintiff will be unable to settle with the 
agent for anything less than a full satisfaction for his 
injuries, for to do so under the Court's ruling would 
terminate any further rights against the principal. An 
agent who has no means to pay for a full satisfaction, 
but who could have paid a partial compensation, will 
have to be made a party to the action. 
The Court's decision in the case, in truth conflicts 
with the policy of the law to encourage the out-of-court 
settlement of disputes. 
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v. 
THE COURT'S TECHNICAL APPLICA-
TION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RESPON-
DEAT SUPERIOR DEFEATS THE VERY 
P UR P 0 SE AND POLICY UNDERLYING 
THAT DOCTRINE. 
The doctrine of respondeat ·superior was the in-
vention of courts who wanted to insure that parties un-
jured by the acts of agents would be adequately com-
pensated by the principal who, for pecuniary gain, had 
originally set the agent in motion. The development of 
the doctrine is explained quite succintly in Agency and 
Partnership a casebook by Seavy, Reuschlein, and Hall 
(West Publishing Co., 1962, at p. 30.) 
"It may be, as Wigmore said ( 17 Harv.L.Rev. 
391, 1894), that at one time the master was not 
normally responsible for the uncommanded 
acts of his servants. But as early as the first 
years of the 18th century, the court in Hern v. 
Nichols, (I Salk 289, 1708), imposed liability 
upon a merchant for the deceit of his factor, 
upon the ground that "there is more reason 
that he that employs and puts a trust and con-
fidence in the deceiver should be the loser than 
a stranger." Undoubtedly this thought largely 
accounts for the imposition of liability upon a 
master. He benefits from the proper acts of 
the servants. Because of their activities, he 
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acquires the means by which he can pay for 
their wrongs; they, on the other hand, are sel-
dom financially responsible. It is not unfair 
that, in return for the privilege which the com-
mon law gives one to accomplish results 
through the aid of other human beings, he 
should pay for the harm done by the errors 
of judgment and negligence of those who 
have created profits for him. 
The creation of such terms as "primary and secondary" 
liability, "active and passive" negligence, "original and 
derivative" responsibility were all for the purpose of 
enabling the injured party to have a cause of action 
against one who could fairly compensate him; but, this 
Court uses these terms to restrict and defeat the in-
jured party's right to an adequate recovery. By accept· 
ing what little the agent is able to pay, the injured ' 
party losses the right to recover against the principal 
who is better able to pay. And what is more ironic is 
that the loss is attributed to the terms found in the doc· 1 
trine originally established to make the principal liable 
and insure full recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should adopt the majority and better 
reasoned rule enunciated above, and reform its opinion 
that a covenant not to sue given an agent releases the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
principal and adopt the view of the Courts heretofore 
cited that the intention of the parties should govern the 
interpretation of a covenant not to sue. 
Plaintiff requests that the Court vacate its judg-
ment handed down January 25, 1972, and return this 
case to the District Court for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jackson Howard, for: 
HOW ARD AND LE\-VIS 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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